Inspiration

WebMCP and browser-native AI context integration introduce security risks regarding prompt injection attacks and indirect PII exfiltration. As LLM agents gain direct read access to DOM state and model context APIs, sensitive user data becomes vulnerable to rogue contextual payloads. WebMCP Zero-Trust Vault enforces a strict boundary between raw DOM data and the context fed into AI execution environments.

What it does

WebMCP Zero-Trust Vault is a security middleware that intercepts context calls (navigator.modelContext.getContext()), sanitizes DOM input, and encrypts sensitive payload data using WebCrypto isolation:

  • Context Interception & Filtering: Captures visible DOM nodes via viewport-aware TreeWalker inspection.
  • Lexical Sanitization (SIMD Rust/WASM): Neutralizes indirect prompt injections and maps PII patterns to volatile UUID tokens.
  • Worker-Isolated Encryption: Encrypts context payloads using non-exportable AES-GCM-256 keys inside an isolated Web Worker thread.
  • Edge Policy Enforcement: Distributes declarative security policies globally via Cloudflare Workers KV with sub-10ms distribution latency.
  • Web3 Provenance: Signs context hashes using EIP-4361 (SIWE) and EIP-191 standards for auditability.

How we built it

The system follows a modular architecture:

  • Core Engine: Rust compiled to WebAssembly with SIMD vectorization (core-wasm/).
  • Cryptographic Layer: WebCrypto API utilizing non-exportable AES-GCM keys managed in a Dedicated Web Worker (worker-crypto/).
  • Client SDK: TypeScript interceptor library wrapped as an ESM module (sdk-client/).
  • Edge Layer: Cloudflare Workers handling policy fetches and signature verification (edge-worker/).
  • Browser Sandbox: Chrome Extension built under Manifest V3 (extension-chrome/).

Challenges we ran into

  • Performance Constraints: Meeting the Alignment Control Framework (MCA) target of total latency $\Delta t \le 15.00\text{ ms}$ while executing SIMD sanitization and WebCrypto operations.
  • Zero Memory Persistence: Guaranteeing $T_{\text{mem}} = 0.00\text{ bytes}$ retention in localStorage, IndexedDB, or cookies post-session required explicit memory scrubbing routines (purge_memory()) across the WASM heap and Worker context.
  • Zero-Copy Transfers: Passing context state across thread boundaries without memory duplication using ArrayBuffer transfers.

Accomplishments

  • Achieved 0.00% PII exfiltration rate across standardized indirect prompt injection test vectors.
  • Kept total static SDK footprint under $15.00\text{ KB}$ ($S_{\text{SDK}} < 15\text{ KB}$).
  • Verified local execution time $\le 15.00\text{ ms}$ per context extraction cycle.

What's next for WebMCP Zero-Trust Vault

  • Integration with emerging browser-native LLM APIs as WebMCP standards evolve.
  • Automated ZK-proof generation for zero-knowledge context policy compliance.

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