Inspiration
I study software supply-chain security. Teams that ship QNX products now have to hand over an SBOM and keep answering "are we affected by CVE-X?": the EU Cyber Resilience Act's reporting duties started on 11 September 2026, FDA premarket submissions need an SBOM, and automotive teams answer to UNECE R155. The tools I found either list what is inside an IFS after the fact or read a package database. Neither can say which buildfile line put a file in the image, whether the device in the field still holds those bytes, or whether a vulnerable library is ever loaded. On QNX the build already knows most of this: the buildfiles name every file, and the system can report what each process has mapped.
What it does
- SBOM from the buildfiles.
qbom buildreads the mkifs buildfile of the IFS and the mkqnx6fsimg buildfiles of the partitions, resolves each entry the way the tools do, and writes CycloneDX 1.6 and SPDX 2.3. Every file carries the buildfile and line that put it there, its host path, the hash the image really stores (mkifs strips ELF files, so qbom reads the built IFS back with dumpifs), its QNX package and version fromQNX_info, and what starts it at boot. - Boot as the device runs it. qbom follows the IFS script into the shell scripts it hands over to, and reads SLM configurations: on a
--slm=yesimage it lists 18 SLM components with their config line and dependencies. - The library that really runs. Packages from repo.oss.qnx.com are tied to files through the apk database, and each file is checked against the database checksum. NEEDED entries are resolved in ldqnx's order, including a
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=in front of a boot command. - A device that checks itself.
sbomdis a resource manager on the target with three names:/dev/sbom/expected(the build's manifest),/dev/sbom/status(OK 232orDRIFT 1 / changed /system/bin/curl ..., re-checked on a timer pulse, logged to slog2) and/dev/sbom/inventory(files, processes and their mapped objects from/proc). - VEX by what runs.
qbom vexscores only the open-source packages against NVD. A package loaded by a running process staysin_triagewith the process as evidence. One that nothing starts or loads isnot_affected / code_not_reachable, with the time of the inventory. One whose files never reached the image isnot_affected / code_not_present. - For people and for agents.
qbom whyprints the chain from a boot line to a library and the process that maps it;qbom reportwrites one HTML page;qbom mcpis an MCP server, so a coding agent can ask the same questions.
What I found on a real image
I put curl, OpenSSL and libxml2 from repo.oss.qnx.com into a mkqnximage image. The apk database says libcurl 8.23.0. On the device, the telemetry uplink reports the SDP's own libcurl. mkqnx6fsimg keeps the first entry for a path, and the SDP's lib/libcurl.so.12 comes first; and LD_LIBRARY_PATH puts /proc/boot first, so its libcrypto wins. A scanner that trusts the database describes a library that does not run. qbom names the real source at build time.
With the ports in their own directory, the same image built with the 8.0.3 ports and then with the 8.0.5 ports:
| 8.0.3 ports | 8.0.5 ports | |
|---|---|---|
| uplinkd reports | libcurl/8.15.0 OpenSSL/3.6.0 | libcurl/8.23.0 OpenSSL/3.6.3 |
| package/CVE pairs loaded by a running process | 164 | 47 |
| of them in libcurl | 43 | 0 |
| in the image but never loaded | 74 | 19 |
The device check passed on both, so every hash in the SBOM matched the target.
How I built it
- Host tool: Python 3, standard library only (buildfile parser, mkifs search-path rules, ELF metadata reader, APKINDEX and installed-database reader, CycloneDX/SPDX/VEX/OpenVEX writers, NVD client with a cache, HTML report, MCP server over stdio). 43 tests on synthetic ELF files; no QNX file is in the repository.
- Target: C for QNX 8.0, built with qcc 12.2.0 (
-Vgcc_ntox86_64). sbomd uses the resmgr framework with single-threaded dispatch, a timer pulse, slog2 and/proc/<pid>/ctl; its portable core is tested on the host under ASan and UBSan. - Demo workloads:
pumpd, a 1 kHz FIFO control loop on a timer pulse that compresses telemetry with zlib-ng, anduplinkd, which sends it with libcurl. - Test bed: QNX SDP 8.0 in WSL 2 Ubuntu 24.04, images from mkqnximage (script boot and SLM boot), QEMU with KVM, ports installed from repo.oss.qnx.com with apk-tools and the repository's signing key.
demo/run-demo.shrepeats it all.
The files that show the QNX connection
target/sbomd/sbomd.c: the resource manager (dispatch, iofunc, resmgr_attach, timer pulse, slog2, DCMD_PROC_MAPINFO and DCMD_PROC_MAPDEBUG).demo/pumpd/pumpd.canddemo/uplinkd/uplinkd.c: QNX 8.0 programs (timer pulse at SCHED_FIFO, slog2).demo/run-demo.sh: qcc, mkqnximage, QEMU, the device check and VEX, end to end.src/qbom/buildfile.py,resolve.py,sbom.py: mkifs and mkqnx6fsimg semantics, dumpifs read-back, SLM, ldqnx order.
Build and run
- QNX SDP 8.0 (non-commercial licence), x86_64 target under QEMU, toolchain qcc 12.2.0 / gcc_ntox86_64.
source ~/qnx800/qnxsdp-env.sh, thenAPK=/path/to/apk.static demo/run-demo.sh /tmp/qbom-demo 8.0.5 isolated.- Without the SDP:
python examples/make_example.py /tmp/exand the commands in the README run on any machine. - Codelab: https://emilhuseyn.github.io/qbom/qnx-image-sbom/
Challenges
- The first device check reported 66 differences, and every one was my mistake: stripped ELF files, procnto running in place, autolink in mkifs but not in mkqnx6fsimg, partition mount points, hard links, inline files without
=. Each became a rule and a test. - The QNX licence does not allow publishing functional evaluations of QNX software. qbom therefore lists SDP components but scores only open-source packages, and the repository holds no QNX files.
What I learned
- On QNX the build output is not the image: what reaches the disk depends on the order of buildfile entries, and what runs depends on the library path. An SBOM has to model both to be true.
- Runtime evidence from
/procturns a long CVE list into a short one, and says why.
What's next
- Run on hardware: Raspberry Pi 4 and 5 (aarch64), and images with secure procfs.
- Sign the manifest so sbomd accepts only a manifest from the build.
- A GitHub Action that builds the SBOM and fails a release on drift or missing libraries.